


















The “comparability” of climate mitigation efforts undertaken by developed countries can be assessed 
in many different ways. Some relevant factors such as emissions, population, and GDP are readily 
quantified and compared; others, such as a country’s geography, economic structure, or trade profile, 
are not. Given the multiplicity of factors at play, parties are unlikely to agree on an explicit formula 
to determine, or to assess the comparability of, their respective efforts. Rather, efforts are likely 
to be agreed through political bargaining in which countries emphasize the metrics and national 
circumstances that most favor their positions. The outcome will likely rest on parties’ mutual 
assessments of one another’s efforts, employing the criteria they deem most relevant.
Comparability of Developed 
Country Mitigation Efforts
Introduction
In framing the current round of climate change 
negotiations under the U.N. Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Bali Action Plan calls for 
“ensuring the comparability of efforts” among developed 
countries.1 Specifically, it states that an “agreed 
outcome” should include:
Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, 
including quantified emission limitation and 
reduction objectives, by all developed country 
Parties, while ensuring the comparability 
of efforts among them, taking into account 
differences in their national circumstances…
A host of factors bear on the question of comparability 
of effort. Some, such as emissions, population and 
GDP, are more readily quantifiable. Considered side by 
side in various combinations, these factors produce a 
range of metrics that may be used to compare efforts 
across countries. Other important factors relevant to 
comparability—such as climate, geography, resource 
base, economic structure, trade profile and other 
“national circumstances”—are more difficult to  
quantify and, hence, to compare. 
This policy brief identifies an array of relevant factors 
and illustrates how some of them speak to the question 
of comparability of developed country efforts. “Effort” is 
understood here as the mitigation effort required under 
an absolute economy-wide emissions target (although 
supplemental policies and measures or a party’s 
financial contribution under an agreement might also be 
considered important elements of its overall effort). The 
brief examines in particular alternative time horizons for 
calculating emission targets and alternative measures 
of mitigation cost. (Note: Specific figures are presented 
for illustrative purposes only and are not intended as 
recommendations or proposals.)
Elements of Comparability 
Efforts to assess comparability often rely on a handful of 
quantifiable factors that can be combined any number 
of ways to produce a potpourri of metrics, each offering 
a different slant on the issue (see Figure 1). The central 
factor is greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, which, in 
the simplest of metrics, is set against a second factor 
such as population, gross domestic product (GDP), 
or mitigation cost. In more complex metrics, multiple 
factors are considered simultaneously—for instance, 
mitigation costs per capita or per GDP at a given level 
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of emission reduction. In all cases, one critical variable 
is the element of time—whether the metric is applied at 
a given point in time, or over a period of time. Particular 
metrics are sometimes associated with certain comparability 
principles—for example, cumulative emissions as a proxy for 
“responsibility,” or mitigation cost per GDP for “capability.” 
An important consideration in relying on such metrics is 
the quality of the underlying data. In the case of developed 
countries, reliable data on current population and GDP are 
widely available, and national greenhouse gas inventories 
are submitted and reviewed under the UNFCCC. However, 
unlike these factors, which can be measured or estimated, 
mitigation cost is a calculation based on a range of factors and 
assumptions, and is therefore subject to greater uncertainty. 
For all of these factors, there is added uncertainty when 
projecting into the future. This is especially true in the case of 
mitigation costs, as is discussed below.
Beyond these core factors are a wide array of specific national 
circumstances that strongly influence many countries’ 
perspectives on comparability. For instance, countries with more 
extreme climates may have greater heating or cooling needs. 
Some countries are well endowed with coal while others have 
greater wind, solar, or hydropower resources. Some are more 
economically dependent than others on GHG-intensive exports. 
While all of these factors are to some degree quantifiable, in 
most cases there are limited sources of consistent data across 
countries, so precise comparisons are more difficult. A number 
of these factors are also shown in Figure 1.
Choosing a Time Horizon
In weighing the comparability of future mitigation efforts, 
the most common yardstick is change in emissions from 
a common starting point to a common future end point. 
For instance, the targets in the Kyoto Protocol specify 
a percentage reduction (or, in a few cases, increase) in 
emissions from 1990 to 2008-2012. Altering either the base 
year or the compliance period can influence how comparable 
targets may appear.
Depending on the base year chosen, certain factors bearing 
on countries’ emission profiles are implicitly given greater or 
lesser weight. An historical base year, e.g. 1990, gives greater 
weight to the efforts countries have—or have not—taken 
from that time to the present. If all countries were required 
to reduce their emissions by the same percentage from an 
historical base year, those with stronger past efforts would 
be required to do comparatively less from the present to the 
future end point. An historical base year also assigns greater 
weight to circumstances other than “effort” that may have 






Annual, cumulative, projected emissions
Emission per capita (current, historic, projected)
Emissions per GDP (current, historic, projected)
Mitigation cost per capita
Mitigation cost per GDP
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Economic and trade profileClimate and geography
Resource base and energy profile Past efforts
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Figure 1. Factors relevant to assessing comparability
A range of comparability-related metrics can be derived from a narrow set of quantifiable factors (at top). Some relevant factors 
(below) are only partly reflected in these quantified metrics, and generally are less readily quantified and compared.
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more favorable to countries that for reasons such as economic 
restructuring have experienced a decline in emissions, and 
less favorable to those that for reasons such as population 
growth have experienced an increase in emissions.
A current or recent base year, on the other hand, deemphasizes 
past efforts or other changes in circumstance. In a sense, 
it wipes the slate clean. Countries that have acted to 
reduce emissions would receive no implicit credit for 
their efforts; they would be required to do more under 
targets requiring uniform percentage reductions from a 
current base year than they would under targets requiring 
the same percentage reduction from an historical base 
year. Conversely, a current base year is more favorable to 
countries that have not yet acted to reduce emissions, or have 
experienced circumstances contributing to emissions growth. 
To date, targets under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
have relied primarily on a 1990 baseline.2 In the current 
negotiations, some parties have called for consideration of 
alternative or supplemental base years, such as 2005, or 
for expressing targets in terms of absolute tons of allowable 
emissions, with no reference to a base year. 
Figure 2 shows how the emissions, population, and GDP 
of the major developed country parties changed from 
1990 to 2005. Figure 3 blends these metrics to show 
how total emissions, per capita emissions, and emissions 
intensity (emissions per unit GDP) have changed relative 
to one another. Emissions intensity has declined in all of 
these countries. Per capita emissions have either declined 
or, in those countries with steady or rising emissions, 
have grown less than total emissions. All three measures 
declined only in Europe (EU-27), Russia and the Ukraine.
Figure 4 illustrates how countries would fare using alternative 
base years. It shows how much each would be required to 
reduce its emissions from 2005 levels under two scenarios: 
uniform targets of 25 percent below 1990, and uniform 
targets of 25 percent below 2005. (Note: The specific targets 
represented are illustrative only and are not intended to reflect 
preferred outcomes or the positions of individual parties.)
As can be seen, for countries whose emissions have declined 























































































































































































Figure 2. Percentage change in emissions (CO2-e 
excluding land use), population, and GDP, 1990-2005
Source: Developed from IEA statistics (energy-related emissions only)
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Figure 3. Relative changes in total emissions, per capita emissions, and emissions intensity, 1990-2005
Figure 4. Alternative base years (reductions relative to 2005 emissions)
Source: Developed from IEA statistics (energy-related emissions only)
Source: Figures developed from UNFCCC/GHG Data/Time Series-Annex 1/1990-2005
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mitigation efforts or for other reasons such as declining 
population or GDP, an equal reduction from a 1990 baseline 
would require a comparatively smaller reduction from 2005 
(or allow an increase). On the other hand, for countries that 
have experienced significant emissions and population growth 
since 1990 (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United 
States), an equal reduction from a 2005 baseline would 
require a comparatively smaller reduction from 1990 (or allow 
an increase). For a country like Switzerland, whose emissions 
have not changed significantly since 1990, neither baseline 
confers a major advantage.
The comparability lens can also be refocused by altering 
the other key time variable—a target’s end point. This is 




















Figure 5. Altering a target’s end point
Comparing EU and US Targets
The relevance of base years is starkly illustrated by the 
comparison of 2020 emission targets for the European 
Union (EU-27) and the U.S. The figure on the left shows 
the EU’s present target, and the target contained in 
legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives 
(but not yet enacted), against a 1990 baseline. The 
figure on the right shows the same targets against a 
2005 baseline. The difference reflects the fact that 
Europe’s emissions have largely leveled since 1990, 
while U.S. emissions have continued to grow.




































In this hypothetical illustration, countries A and B start at 10% and 20%, respectively, above 1990 levels. If both must reduce to 
25% below 1990 in 2020, the difference between their annual rates of reduction is 0.67%. However, with a more ambitious target 
(40% below 1990) at a later date (2030), the difference between their annual reduction rates is only 0.4%. 
particularly true in the case of targets pegged to an historical 
base year. If the base year is 1990 and the compliance date 
is 2020, a uniform target would imply very different levels 
of reduction (from current emissions) for different countries. 
Annual rates of reduction would vary widely. To achieve more 
consistent annual rates of reduction, target values (e.g.,  
-15 percent or -30 percent) would have to vary widely. 
However, as seen in Figure 5, a later target date such as 
2030 spreads the required reduction over a longer period of 
time. Uniform targets would in that case imply less variation 
in annual rates of reduction. A later target date might 
therefore allow target values that are less disparate and, 
consequently, appear more comparable.
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Comparing Mitigation Cost
Another factor weighing heavily in parties’ assessments of 
comparability is the potential cost to countries of meeting 
their respective targets. Abatement cost is typically expressed 
in two ways:
• Marginal abatement cost, or the per-ton cost of removing 
the last ton of GHGs to achieve a given target; and
• Total abatement cost,3 or the total expenditures required 
to achieve a given target, often expressed as a percentage 
of GDP.
Projections of abatement cost are produced by economic models 
that rely on many key assumptions, and are therefore subject 
to a wide range of uncertainties. Cost projections often vary 
considerably depending on the model4 and the assumptions 
employed. Among the more critical assumptions are the 
economic baseline (how an economy is projected to perform 
in the absence of climate policy); projected emission trends; 
existing and anticipated GHG policies; and future technology 
costs and availability. Divergent models and assumptions make 
consensus on any given set of projections difficult. 
Marginal Abatement Cost
Marginal cost is most relevant to comparability as a factor in 
assessing respective mitigation potentials. Marginal abatement 
costs vary considerably across countries depending on their 
economic and energy profiles, past mitigation efforts, expected 
emissions growth, resource constraints, technology options, 
etc. As illustrated in Figure 6,5 uniform reduction targets (in 
this case, 25 percent below 2005 levels by 2020), imply 
very different marginal costs for different countries.6 (It is 
important to emphasize that these results are drawn from a 
single model and, hence, reflect a given set of assumptions.  
For instance, Japan’s marginal abatement costs appear 
much lower than most other countries’ in part because the 
“reference” or business-as-usual case in the model assumes 
that Japan’s emissions will decline by 2020, while other 
countries’ emissions will grow. Altering those assumptions 
would produce different cost projections.)
The converse is also true. As illustrated in Figure 7, if 
countries were each to abate to the same marginal cost (with 
an aggregate reduction of 25 percent below 2005), the 
implied targets would be highly disproportionate, ranging 
from -20 percent to -41 percent. Countries or regions such 
as the Former Soviet Union (FSU) with lower-cost abatement 
opportunities and lower projected emissions growth would bear 
the most stringent emission reduction targets, a distribution of 
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of 25 percent below 2005
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Figure 6. Marginal costs with uniform targets
Figure 7. Targets with equal marginal costs
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Total Abatement Cost
Total abatement cost, computed as a percent of GDP to 
account for the differing size of economies, may be a better 
reflection than marginal cost of the overall effort a country 
must undertake to achieve a given level of emission reduction. 
As with marginal costs, uniform reduction targets imply very 
different total abatement costs for countries. Figure 8 illustrates 
total costs, as a percentage of GDP, under two scenarios. The 
first scenario is uniform targets of 25 percent below 2005 
without emissions trading. (Although Japan and the FSU had the 
lowest marginal abatement costs, their costs per GDP diverge 
greatly. The FSU has the highest GDP costs, in part because its 
emissions intensity, or emissions per GDP, is relatively high. By 
contrast, Japan has the lowest emissions intensity.)
The second scenario assumes the same targets, but this 
time with emissions trading. As can be seen, trading lowers 
total abatement costs marginally for most countries, and 
significantly for the FSU. (Because the FSU has lower-cost 
abatement opportunities, it can reduce the cost of meeting its 
target by selling excess reductions to other countries; these 














Total costs as percent of GDP with uniform 2020 targets of 
25 percent below 2005, with and without emissions trading























2020 emission targets with equal total cost (as  percent GDP) assuming 


















Figure 8. Total costs with uniform targets Figure 9. Targets with equal total cost
The principal virtue of trading is that, by equalizing 
marginal costs across countries, it ideally achieves a cost-
effective distribution of the overall abatement effort. If 
trading is assumed, it is also theoretically possible to 
differentiate targets in a way that equalizes total abatement 
costs across countries, while still achieving a cost-effective 
distribution of abatement effort. Figure 9 illustrates 
differential targets with equal total costs for countries, 
an aggregate reduction of 25 percent below 2005, and 
emissions trading. (Here, Japan’s very stringent target again 
reflects the assumption that its emissions will decline under 
business as usual, while other countries’ will grow; it is able 
to achieve a relatively greater reduction for an equivalent 
investment as percent of GDP.) 
For many reasons, parties may not feel that “equal total 
costs” represents comparability of effort. For instance, 
countries that have undertaken stronger efforts in the past 
may feel that they should not bear the same relative costs 
as other countries going forward. Comparability could 
be understood, however, as a reasonable or acceptable 
distribution of costs taking into account other factors 
reflecting countries’ individual circumstances.
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Conclusions
Each of the many quantifiable metrics available provides 
its own unique slant on comparability. Given the diversity 
and divergence of factors shaping their circumstances, 
each country is likely to favor some metrics over others. As 
a result, parties are unlikely to address comparability by 
agreeing on an explicit formula to determine, or to assess 
the comparability of, their respective efforts. Rather, efforts 
are more likely to be agreed through political bargaining 
in which countries emphasize the metrics and national 
circumstances that most favor their positions. This process 
could be informed and assisted by an agreed set of data or 
analyses; full transparency would be critical to the credibility 
of, and parties’ confidence in, these data. But in the end, 
the political outcome will likely rest on parties’ mutual 
assessments of one another’s efforts, employing the criteria 
they deem most relevant.
Notes
1 In the case of developing countries, the Bali Action Plan calls for “nation-
ally appropriate mitigation actions…in the context of sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner,” with no reference to comparabil-
ity. Accordingly, this brief looks at comparability only in the context of developed 
country efforts.
2 1990 was chosen primarily because it was the year for which the most recent 
data were available when the 1992 Framework Convention was negotiated.  Alter-
native baselines are permitted for certain gases and countries.
3 Total abatement cost is an incomplete measure of the full economy-wide cost 
of mitigation (the social or welfare cost). Social cost represents the opportunity 
cost to society of reallocating resources away from current uses toward mitigation 
activities. It reflects, among other things, indirect effects that take place outside of 
directly affected markets and are transmitted through price changes. 
4 “Top-down” or macroeconomic models are better at accounting for the indirect 
economic effects of climate policy but often poorly reflect important technology- 
or sector-specific dynamics. “Bottom-up” models draw on engineering studies 
to better represent the details of specific technologies but are not as good at 
capturing broader economic effects. The model’s scope—global vs. national or 
regional—also will influence its results.
5 The cost estimates in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 are derived from a series of model-
ing runs by the Joint Global Change Research Institute of the Pacific Northwest 
Laboratory/Battelle Memorial Institute and are presented for illustrative purposes 
only. The modeling was performed on MiniCAM, a global, long-term, integrated 
assessment model developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and used 
to explore strategies for addressing climate change. For details on MiniCAM, see 
http://www.globalchange.umd.edu/.
6 The marginal cost estimates presented here assume no emissions trading—i.e., 
each country achieves its required reductions domestically. Theoretically, allowing 
emissions trading across countries would equalize marginal costs, achieving the 
same global reduction at a lower overall cost. 
